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As Trump 2.0 redefines transatlantic ties, Europe faces reduced US support, political rifts, and pressure to take charge of its security and China policy.

In February 2024, Donald Trump stood in front of a cheering crowd at a campaign rally in Conway, South Carolina, recalling his conversation with the president of a ‘big European country.’  That president, the story goes, asked Trump if the United States (US) would defend their country even if it didn’t meet the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) defence spending targets. Not only did Trump answer with a resounding “no”, he also said he would encourage Putin to do “whatever the hell he wanted” to NATO countries that didn’t “pay their bills”. This statement created panic in the US and Europe, with then-President Biden and European leaders using it as an example of how Trump would abandon allies and destroy the Transatlantic relationship if re-elected. While the fear of destruction may be overstated, it is clear after just a couple of months that Trump and his team will fundamentally reshape the US-European relationship under a new set of rules and expectations.

While the fear of destruction may be overstated, it is clear after just a couple of months that Trump and his team will fundamentally reshape the US-European relationship under a new set of rules and expectations.

Since the end of World War II—and even more so since the end of the Cold War—the US and Europeans have operated under the symbiotic assumption that the US is vital as the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security. The US security guarantees and its physical military presence on the European continent have allowed the US to counter Russia and project power abroad. However, it has also provided Europe’s ultimate deterrence and given the US certain leverage and say over Europe’s foreign policy. That underlying contract has, until now, succeeded in the eyes of Transatlantic leaders. After all, guaranteeing Europe’s security has been a small price to pay for an ally across the Atlantic that shares US democratic values, is America’s largest bilateral trade and investment partner, and helps the US manage the so-called ‘liberal international order.’

Donald Trump and many of the so-called  ‘prioritisers’ staffing his administration don’t see it that way. This marks the first key to understanding how the US-European relationship might develop under Trump’s second term. In their eyes, the US has coddled Europe and treated it with kid gloves for the past 35 years. Europe’s dependency on the US security guarantees directly inhibits America’s ability to project power elsewhere, and with the Europeans free-riding off of US resources, it allows them to spend more money on their social programmes.

Europeans shouldn’t expect the relationship to continue as usual under Trump’s second term, which Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth made abundantly clear during his first trip to NATO in February. He told allies he was there to “directly and unambiguously express that stark strategic realities prevent the United States of America from being primarily focused on the security of Europe” and that “European allies must lead from the front”. Of course, this message scandalised the Europeans, but the ideas contained within these statements aren’t new. The US presidents going back to Dwight D. Eisenhower have complained about European free riding. The difficulty lies in how to make these changes to the Transatlantic relationship a reality.

Europeans shouldn’t expect the relationship to continue as usual under Trump’s second term, which Secretary of Defence Pete Hegseth made abundantly clear during his first trip to NATO in February.

Under Trump’s second term, Europe should expect a general decrease in American support for European security, including a drawdown of the US force presence on the continent. Trump has already said he wants to cut troop levels in Europe by at least 20,000 and demand a subsidy from allies to pay for the remaining US military presence. While the feasibility of the second half of this plan seems uncertain, the proposed reductions in troop levels make logistical sense. Europe's armies have a combined military personnel of 1.9 million, and it is not far-fetched to expect them to take on more of the burden of Europe’s defence. Until now, the mere mention of a decreased US presence in Europe has elicited panic, but this idea might persist far beyond the next four years of Trump’s presidency, so Europe should start preparing. Meanwhile,  Trump and his team must also ensure the plans they undertake are orderly and in lockstep with the Europeans.

Beyond security and defence, the political landscape in the US and Europe is also beginning to crack under the pressure of diverging norms and values. As US Vice President J.D. Vance made clear during his speech in February at the Munich Security Conference, the Trump team believes Europe’s threat comes from within. That Europe is retreating from the democratic values historically shared with the US, mainly in free speech, religious freedom, and mass migration. Notwithstanding the domestic resonance of such observations, a clear question emerges regarding its potential geopolitical implications for the wider Transatlantic alliance moving forward. For one, the Trump team will likely eschew historical precedence of not getting involved in foreign elections and vocally support European parties in line with their political vision. This has already happened with Elon Musk’s support of the right-wing AfD party in Germany, the Vox party in Spain, and Georgia Meloni’s Fratelli d’Italia party in Italy. It also means Trump will take a highly transactional approach toward Europe, especially with countries that do not politically align with him. This may play out most clearly when it comes to European economic interdependence with China. In Trump’s mind, China has it both ways in terms of Europe: It has access to European markets and critical infrastructure, directly supporting its global economic ambitions. Although it is too early to tell how this may play out in the long term, the European Union (and various EU nations) should brace itself for extreme pressure from the White House regarding its China policy over the next four years. Europe may feel like it is being forced to pick sides, which could further weaken Europe’s already-fractured approach concerning China.

Trump will take a highly transactional approach toward Europe, especially with countries that do not politically align with him.

The first couple of months of Trump’s second term have already sent the Transatlantic partnership into a tailspin—indeed, high-level Europeans left the Munich Security Conference stunned over the messages received from American political leaders. But they should not have been surprised. In retrospect, Biden’s unambiguous “America is back” message to allies after being elected should’ve warranted greater scrutiny. This message ignored basic geopolitical realities and lulled the Europeans into a false sense of security. Now, Europeans are back to square one, scrambling to figure out how to deal with the US over the next four years as Trump and his team drastically re-orient 80 years of historical precedence. The US-European relationship will survive as it has for decades, but it may look fundamentally different. Europe will finally have to stand on its own two feet.

Rachel Rizzo (Atlantic Council)
21 March 2025

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